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There is disagreement regarding the role of perceived control in obsessive–compulsive
disorder (OCD). The present study used a traditional illusion of control paradigm (Alloy and
Abramson, 1979) to empirically test control estimation in OCD. Twenty-six OCD patients
and 26 matched comparison subjects completed an illusion of control task wherein their
goal was to attempt to exert control over a light bulb. The density of reinforcement (high,
low) and the valence of trials (gain, loss) were experimentally manipulated within subjects.
Unbeknownst to participants, the illumination of the light bulb was predetermined and
irrespective of their behavior. OCD patients exhibited lower estimates of control compared
with healthy comparison subjects.Therewere no interactions between group and outcome
density or group and valence. We found that OCD patients endorse lower estimates of
control than comparison subjects. This ﬁnding highlights a potential role for contingency
learning in the disorder.
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INTRODUCTION
Obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) is a condition in which
patients suffer from distressing obsessive thoughts (e.g., that harm
will come to a loved one) and feel compelled to perform actions
(e.g., repeatedly counting or checking; APA, 2013). According
to many researchers, compulsions in OCD constitute excessive
attempts to gain control over threats and reduce anxiety (Carr,
1974; McFall andWollersheim, 1979; Foa and Kozak, 1986).While
some authors posit that these excessive control attempts are used
to compensate for a lack of perceived control over life events
(McLaren and Crowe, 2003; Moulding and Kyrios, 2006), oth-
ers have suggested the very opposite, that these efforts to gain
control reﬂect the OCD patient’s belief that they have an exagger-
ated sense of control or “power,” a factor thought to contribute to
heightened responsibility cognitions (Salkovskis, 1996). Despite
considerable discourse on the topic, there is little empirical data
regarding control beliefs in OCD patients.
In one study, however, Reuven-Magril et al. (2008) employed
a control estimation task in which participants attempted to
decrease the duration that neutral and aversive images were dis-
played on the screen by using a sequence of button-presses.
Participants were unaware that there was in fact no relation-
ship between their button-press patterns and the duration that
the image was presented. They found that obsessive–compulsive
symptoms were related to an increased self-reported sense of con-
trol over the duration of the image and a decrease in key press
variability. As the task employed in this study was novel, we sought
to test if this effect was replicable using a task that conforms
to the previous (and vast) literature on the illusion of control
phenomenon.
In 1979, Alloy andAbramson reported that, in situations where
there is no relationship between actions and outcomes, but the
density of reinforcement is high, healthy individuals experience
an optimism bias called the “illusion of control.” That is, they
inappropriately infer contingency on the basis of how often rein-
forcing outcomes are presented to them. In their seminal report,
Alloy andAbramson found that individuals suffering fromdepres-
sion do not succumb to the illusion of control bias. This ﬁnding
was termed “depressive realism,” and has seen multiple replica-
tions (Alloy et al., 1981; Martin et al., 1984; Benassi and Mahler,
1985;Vazquez, 1987; Presson and Benassi, 2003; Msetﬁ et al., 2005,
2007). In this classic paradigm, participants are presented with an
unlit light bulb and a button. Although there are many variations,
subjects are typically informed that they can press or not press the
button on a given trial and should try and ﬁgure out how much
control they have over the light bulb. In the present study, we used
the basic speciﬁcations of this paradigm, wherein outcomes were
binary (successes or failures), there was no contingency between
responses and light bulb illumination, and the density of out-
come presentation (light bulb illumination) was experimentally
manipulated using a block design.
The main differences between the paradigm employed by
Reuven-Magril et al. (2008) and the classic paradigm, which
we employed in the present study are as follows: (i) key press
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combinations are utilized in the Reuven-Magril et al.’s (2008)
study rather than binary response vs. no-response options, (ii)
these authors also used a gradual change in spurious reinforcement
rather than a blocked design where reinforcement density is held
constant within blocks, and (iii) they used continuous reinforcers,
i.e., a reduction in the duration of a video, rather than binary out-
comes of reward vs. no-reward (i.e., light bulb illuminates or does
not).
HYPOTHESIS
Obsessive–compulsive disorder patients will show an exaggerate
illusion of control on the illusion of control task, in line with the
results of a recent study (Reuven-Magril et al., 2008) employing a
novel methodology for assessing control estimation. We did not
predict any differences in terms of trial-by-trial behavior (number
of responses or variability), as response options on this task are
binary and subjects are explicitly encouraged to sample equally
across the “response” and “no-response” options.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
This study was approved by the Cambridgeshire 2 Research
Ethics Committee (10/H0308/27). Twenty-six OCD patients (15
females) and 26 age-matched comparison subjects (15 females)
completed the experiment. OCD patients were screened by
a psychiatrist using an extended clinical interview to ensure
that they met the DSM-V criteria for OCD (APA, 2013),
had severity scores exceeding 12 on the Yale–Brown Obses-
sive Compulsive Scale (YBOCS; Goodman et al., 1989), and
had no co-morbid psychiatric disorders. We excluded OCD
patients for whom hoarding was the primary complaint. Con-
trols were recruited from the local community via advertisement
and given the same study description as the patient group.
Exclusion criteria for all participants were substance depen-
dence and depression scores exceeding 16 on the Montgomery–
Åsberg Depression Rating Scale (MADRS; Montgomery and
Asberg, 1979). OCD patients had a mean YBOCS score of
22.58 (SD = 5.25), with mean values of 10.77 (SD = 3.82)
and 11.77 (SD = 2.9) on the obsessions and compulsions
subscales, respectively. As is characteristic of this population,
OCD patients reported higher levels of depressive symptoms
(though well below clinical threshold), anxiety, and personal
responsibility (Table 1). OCD patients had spent signiﬁcantly
fewer years in education, but there were no differences in ver-
bal IQ skills assessed using the National Adult Reading Test
(NART; Nelson, 1982; Table 1). Eighteen patients were medi-
cated [8 unmedicated; 1 tricyclic anti-depressant clomipramine;
1 antidepressant agomelatine; 10 SSRI (selective serotonin reup-
take inhibitor) only; 4 SSRI + antipsychotic; 1 SSRI + lithium
bicarbonate; 1 SSRI + beta-blocker propranolol]. Participants
completed two additional tests in this battery, in a fully coun-
terbalanced order. The results of which are published elsewhere
(Gillan et al., 2013b), or in preparation. The entire session took
approximately 2 h.
PROCEDURE
Subjects were told that their goal was to illuminate a light bulb as
often as possible by pressing or not pressing the spacebar. Subjects
were informed that they also had to determine the contingency
between their actions and the illumination of the light bulb. Each
trial began with a display of an unlit light bulb. Participants
decided whether or not to respond within 1.5 s. At the end of
each section, subjects rated the degree of control they believed
they had over the light bulb on a visual analog scale (VAS) ranging
from 0 (“no control”) to 100 (“complete control”).
Each block comprised 40 trials. There was never any contin-
gency between button presses and the illumination of the light
bulb. In two blocks, there was a high rate of non-contingent out-
come presentation, where the light bulb illuminated on 65% of
trials regardless of responding (Figure 1). In the two low reinforce-
ment blocks, the rate of non-contingent outcome presentationwas
35%. Reuven-Magril et al. (2008) found that differences associated
with obsessive–compulsive symptoms are greatest when subjects
had to control aversive (vs. neutral) images. Therefore,we included
a valence factor wherein, in one of each of the high and low blocks,
subjects were told that their goal was to avoid losing money, which
started at £3.00. In the remaining two high and low blocks, sub-
jects’ goal was to earn money, starting with £0. Gains and losses
of 5p were instantly added to or subtracted from subjects’ total,
whichwas presented in the top right corner of the screen. Outcome
Table 1 | Group demographics.
Comparison subjects OCD F -value df p-Value
Age 40.38 (13.69) 42.5 (13.7) <1 1,50 0.58
NART (errors) 13.96 (7.32) 14.92 (7.08) <1 1,50 0.632
Education (year) 16.57 (1.77) 15.19 (2.49) 5.32 1,50 0.025
MADRS 1.15 (3.11) 6.69 (3.69) 34.322 1,50 <0.001
OCI-r 9.19 (8.29) 32.81 (11.14) 75.205 1,50 <0.001
STAI-state 30.54 (5.75) 44.19 (8.9) 45.11 1,50 <0.001
STAI-trait 33.54 (8.25) 60.04 (8.49) 130.29 1,50 <0.001
RAS 2.54 (0.746) 3.916 (1.13) 25.979 1,49 <0.001
Mean scores and standard deviations (in parentheses). NART, National Adult Reading Test; OCI-r, Obsessive–Compulsive Inventory-revised; STAI, State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory; RAS, Responsibility Attitude Scale.
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FIGURE 1 |Task structure. Example from the “High Density/Gain” block.
Independent of responding, on 65% of trials the light bulb illuminates and
on 35% it does not illuminate. On trials where the light bulb illuminates, 5p
is added to subjects’ total winnings.
density was manipulated within, rather than between, subjects in
the present study to increase statistical power. The four blockswere
presented in a counterbalanced order across participants using a
Latin square and subjects were informed that: “each of the four
stages is independent of one another and therefore different rules
may apply.”The experimenter was present during the experiment.
Finally, we collected self-report questionnaire data on the Respon-
sibility Attitude Scale (RAS; Salkovskis et al., 2000), Obsessive–
Compulsive Inventory-revised (OCI-r; Foa et al., 2002), and the
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983).
Data from one subject on the RAS were lost due to a technical
error.
TASK INSTRUCTIONS
The following instructions were presented to participants on
screen prior to beginning the experiment:
In this game, your task is to illuminate a light bulb as often as
possible by pressing or not pressing the spacebar. One each trial, an
unlit light bulb will appear on the screen and youwill have the chance
to do something:
(1) You may press the spacebar.
(2) You may not press the spacebar.
On each trial, the unlit light bulb will appear for 1.5 s. During
this time you will have the chance to press the spacebar or not press
the spacebar. A button press consists of pressing the spacebar once
and only once during this 1.5 s interval. If you do not press the space-
bar within this interval, it will be registered as a no press response.
Therefore, there are four possibilities of what might happen on a
given trial:
(1) You make a button press and the light bulb illuminates.
(2) You do not make a button press and the light bulb illuminates.
(3) Youmake a button press and the light bulb does not illuminate.
(4) You do not make a button press and the light bulb does not
illuminate.
Youwill not be told anything about the relationship between press-
ing or not pressing the spacebar and the illumination of the light bulb.
You must ﬁgure this out for yourself in each of the four stages of this
experiment. Therefore, it is in your interest to press on some trials,
but not on others, so that you know what happens when you don’t
press as well as when you do press.
You can win some real money in this experiment! In some stages,
every time the light bulb illuminates, you will win 5 pence. On others,
every time the light bulb does not illuminate, you lose 5p. Whatever
amount you win will be added to your check at the end of today’s
testing session. Therefore on each of the four stages, it is in your
interest to try and get the light to illuminate as often as possible. At
the end of each of the four stages you will be asked to rate the degree
of control you think you have had over the illumination of the light
bulb.
Having NO control means that whether or not the light bulb
illuminates has nothing to do with what you DO or do NOT DO.
In other words, the illumination of the light bulb was totally deter-
mined randomly or by chance, rather than determined by your choice
of responses, either pressing or not pressing. Having an intermediate
level of control, means that your choice of responses, either pressing
or not pressing inﬂuenced the illumination of the light bulb to some
extent even though it did not completely determine whether or not
it illuminated. Having complete control means that the illumina-
tion of the light bulb was completely determined by your choice of
responses, either pressing or not pressing.
This deﬁnition of control was provided to subjects again, prior
to making control ratings at the end of each of the experimental
blocks. Prior to win and loss blocks (respectively), the instructions
read:
“In this block, every time the light bulb illuminates, you will win
5p. Every time it does not illuminate, your total will not change”.
“In this block, every time the light bulb does not illuminate, you
will lose 5p. Every time it illuminates, your total will not change”.
QUESTIONNAIRES
Self-report questionnaire data collected were from the RAS
(Salkovskis et al., 2000), OCI-r (Foa et al., 2002), and the STAI
(Spielberger et al., 1983). The RAS is a 26-item self-report ques-
tionnaire that assesses responsibility cognitions. It was designed
speciﬁcally to assess these cognitions in relation to obsessional
symptoms (e.g., “many of my past actions have been intended to
prevent harm to others”). The RAS has high test–retest reliabil-
ity (r = 0.94), internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.92) and
can distinguish OCD patients from anxious controls (p < 0.001;
Salkovskis et al., 2000). Data from one subject on the RAS were
lost due to a technical error. TheOCI-r is 18-item self-report ques-
tionnaire, which quantiﬁes the severity of OCD symptoms across
six symptom subscales (washing, checking, ordering, obsessing,
hoarding, and neutralizing). The scale has good convergent valid-
ity with the clinician-administeredYBOCS (r = 0.41; Abramowitz
and Deacon, 2006) and adequate test–retest reliability (r = 0.7;
Hajcak et al., 2004). The STAI is a 40-item self-report question-
naire that divides anxiety into“state” and“trait”phenomena. State
anxiety refers to symptoms that are present at the time of testing
(e.g., “I feel nervous”), while trait anxiety refers to anxiety that is
generally present, most of the time (e.g., “I am a steady person”).
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The STAI has high test–retest reliability (median trait: r = 0.88,
median state: r = 0.68) and internal consistency (median trait:
α= 0.90, median state: α= 0.92; Barnes et al., 2002). We also con-
ducted a test of reading ability using theNART (Nelson, 1982), as a
proxy for intelligence. This test was designed to be relatively insen-
sitive to cognitive decline, for example, associated with dementia,
and is therefore often used a measure of premorbid intelligence in
general.
DATA ANALYSIS
Data were analyzed in SPSS using ANOVA, and Pearson’s corre-
lations. For dependent measures control estimation, number of
responses made, and mean reaction time (RT), mixed ANOVAs
with Group (OCD, Comparison Subjects), Outcome Density
(High, Low), and Valence (Gain, Loss) were computed.
RESULTS
ESTIMATION OF CONTROL
Obsessive–compulsive disorder patients made more accurate con-
trol judgments than comparison subjects, evidenced by a signiﬁ-
cant main effect of group, F(1,50) = 5.148, p = 0.028, η2p = 0.093,
with comparison participants reporting greater levels of perceived
control (M = 34%, SD = 16.6) than OCD patients (M = 22%,
SD = 22.18; Figure 2). In line with the existing literature on the
illusion of control, therewas a highly signiﬁcantmain effect of out-
come density (high, low), F(1,50)= 41.438, p< 0.001,η2p = 0.453,
with subjects reporting greater control in the high (M = 36%,
SD = 26.06) relative to the low (M = 20%, SD = 18.84) condition.
There was no effect of valence (gain, loss) on control estimation,
F(1,50) = 1.133, p = 0.232, η2p = 0.022 and no signiﬁcant inter-
actions between group and valence, F < 1, group and outcome
density, F(1,50) = 2.277, p = 0.138, η2p = 0.044, or outcome
density and valence, F(1,50) = 1.263, p = 0.267, η2p = 0.025.
FIGURE 2 | Control estimations by OCD patients and comparison
subjects during a zero contingency task. OCD patients’ estimates were
overall more realistic than comparison subjects independent of the
outcome density (high-65%/low-35%) and valence (gain +5p/loss −5p)
conditions. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
Control estimations in the OCD group did not correlate with
depression scores on theMADRS,orwithmeasures of OCD symp-
tom severity, theYBOCS andOCI-r, all non-signiﬁcant, r < |0.33|.
There was a signiﬁcant positive correlation between responsibil-
ity attitude scores and overall control estimations in the OCD
group, r(26) = 0.391, p = 0.048, such that the greater the extent of
endorsing responsibility attitudes the higher the reported degree
of control over the light bulb. This correlation, however, was not
evident in the comparison subjects, r(25) = 0.193, p = 0.355, and
did not survive correction for multiple comparisons.
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE
The main effect of group remained signiﬁcant when MADRS
depression scores were entered as a covariate in the ANOVA,
F(1,49) = 4.344, p = 0.042, η2p = 0.081, suggesting that depres-
sion symptoms, which have been historically linked to control
estimation bias, did not account for this effect. We repeated
our analysis including years in education as a covariate, as
this also differed signiﬁcantly between groups. While years in
education did not signiﬁcantly affect control estimation rat-
ings, F(1,49) = 2.414, p = 0.127, η2p = 0.047, its inclusion as
a covariate in our analysis reduced our main effect of group
on control estimation to the marginal range: F(1,49) = 2.909,
p = 0.094, η2p = 0.056, suggesting that the difference in years
in education observed across groups was contributing some-
what to our main effect of control estimation. However, analysis
of covariance is particularly sensitive to outliers in the depen-
dent variable. When we removed the control estimation ratings
from one patient (>2 SDs from population mean) in the OCD
group, our main effect of group was signiﬁcant, F(1,48) = 6.129,
p = 0.017, η2p = 0.113, while the effect of education was
unrelated to control estimation, F(1,48) = 1.659, p = 0.204,
η2p = 0.033.
BEHAVIOR
There were no differences between groups in overall RTs, F < 1.
Additionally, there were nomain effects of outcome density, F < 1,
or valence, F(1,50) = 2.219, p = 0.143, η2p = 0.043, on RTs,
nor were there signiﬁcant interactions between group and den-
sity, group and valence, or density and valence, all F < 1. The
three-way interaction between group, valence, and density was
not signiﬁcant, although in the marginal range, F(1,50) = 3.030,
p = 0.088, η2p = 0.057. There were no signiﬁcant group differ-
ences in the number of responses performed (OCD: M = 22.28,
SD = 4.2; Comparison Subjects: M = 21.8, SD = 5.72). Sub-
jects responded overall on just over 50% of trials, consistent
with their instructions. Additionally, there were no effects of out-
come density or valence on the number of responses performed,
all F < 1. The three-way interaction between density, valence,
and group was also non-signiﬁcant, F(1,50) = 1.312, p = 0.257,
η2p = 0.026.
DISCUSSION
Using an illusion of control procedure that has been extensively
studied in the literature (Alloy and Abramson, 1979), we observed
that OCD patients report lower (and more accurate) estimations
of control than healthy comparison subjects. Unlike the depressive
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realism phenomenon, lower estimates in the OCD group were not
conﬁned to the high outcome density blocks; rather OCDpatients’
control estimates were consistently lower than comparison sub-
jects regardless of density or valence. These data are inconsistent
with those published by Reuven-Magril et al. (2008), yet not with
their interpretation of their results. These authors, and others, sug-
gest thatOCDpatients have a reduced sense of control and to cope,
they use behavior (such as repeating key-press patterns) to com-
pensate for this, instilling an illusory sense of control (Frost et al.,
1993; Keinan, 1994; Zebb and Moore, 2003; Moulding et al., 2007;
Reuven-Magril et al., 2008). Our data cannot speak directly to this
hypothesis, but they provide tentative support for one of its tenets,
that OCD patients have a reduced sense of control when behav-
ior is held constant across individuals in terms of response vigor
and pattern variability. Further research is needed to test whether
behavior is a determinant of perceived control in OCD. Although,
OCD patients were more accurate than controls at judging the
absence of contingency in the present experiment, it remains to
be seen if this in fact reﬂects improved accuracy or rather a ﬂat-
tening of contingency experience overall. The present study was
not designed to parse this distinction. If the latter holds true,
these ﬁndings might converge with more recent neurocognitive
assessments that have identiﬁed a disturbance in action–outcome
contingency learning in OCD (Gillan et al., 2011, 2013a). One
possibility is that the difﬁculties linking actions and outcomes
evident in OCD result in a ﬂattened overall contingency expe-
rience, which may leave patients vulnerable to forming habits
(Gillan et al., 2013b). However, this awaits direct test in an exper-
imental setting where true contingency exists between action and
outcome.
There was no evidence for a relationship between control
estimation and depressive symptoms. This was expected, given
that previous studies have shown that the depressive realism
phenomenon breaks down when the experimenter is present
while subjects carry out the task (Benassi and Mahler, 1985).
There are three main limitations to this study. Firstly, we did
not have a positive comparison group such as generalized anx-
iety disorder (GAD) patients, to delineate whether this effect is
speciﬁc to OCD or a common feature of anxiety disorders. Sec-
ondly, the majority of OCD patients were receiving psychotropic
medication, predominantly SSRIs. We did not have sufﬁcient
power to compare medicated and un-medicated patients in the
present study; future studies should investigate if these medi-
cations have an inﬂuence on control estimation in this patient
population. Finally, our groups differed signiﬁcantly in the num-
ber of years spent in education. While this did not affect our
results, there was a trend toward less time in education being
predictive to lower estimates of control. This warrants further
investigation.
To summarize, we did not replicate the ﬁndings of Reuven-
Magril et al. (2008) who found that OCD patients had an
exaggerated sense of control over external events. Using a more
traditional illusion of control paradigm (Alloy and Abramson,
1979), we found evidence in the opposing direction, suggest-
ing that OCD patients have a reduced sense of control. The
most parsimonious explanation for this disparity is the sensi-
tivity of control estimation to changes to task parameters. For
example, healthy individuals typically experience an illusory sense
of control only when there is (i) no contingency between actions
and subsequent outcomes (Alloy and Abramson, 1979; Vazquez,
1987), (ii) the density of reinforcement is high (Alloy and Abram-
son, 1979; Benassi and Mahler, 1985; Vazquez, 1987; Presson
and Benassi, 2003; Msetﬁ et al., 2005), (iii) outcomes are of a
positive valence (Alloy and Abramson, 1979), (iv) inter-trial inter-
vals (ITIs) are sufﬁciently long (Msetﬁ et al., 2005, 2007), and
(v) an observer is not present during the experiment (Benassi
and Mahler, 1985). Some have suggested that this volatility is
indicative of control estimation being a decision-process rather
than a perceptual one (Allan, 2002), and that the illusion of
control task may not be an accurate measurement of sensi-
tivity to contingency, but rather also reﬂects an individual’s
willingness to predict that an outcome will occur, or in other
words “say yes” (Allan et al., 2007). Future research is needed to
assess this possibility and to ascertain whether this paradigm can
provide meaningful clinical insight, given its well-documented
fragility.
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